Investigating corruption charges against womenheads of government by Schramm, Madison V et al.








Investigating corruption charges against womenheads of government
Schramm, Madison V ; Crasnic, Loriana ; Stark, Alexandra
Abstract: Much of the scholarship on gender and corruption suggests that women in political oÿce are
less corrupt than men. However, in just the past five years, corruption accusations against women heads
of government, including Brazil’s Dilma Rousse˙ and South Korea’s Park Geun-hye, have made headlines
and led to their impeachment. In this article, we examine whether women heads of government are more
likely to be charged with corruption and the process by which these charges are levied. Using cross-
national data, including recently-available indicators, we first demonstrate that women are significantly
more likely to be formally accused of corruption. We then explore the cases of Turkish Prime Minister
Tansu Çiller and Brazilian President Dilma Rousse˙ to show that while women heads of government are
taxed for perceived role incongruity, the logic and eÿcacy of corruption charges is also associated with
the belief that women do not belong in the political sphere and are inherently agents of subversion.
These findings make a substantial contribution to the literature on gender, leadership, and politics and
corruption.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-207164
Conference or Workshop Item
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Schramm, Madison V; Crasnic, Loriana; Stark, Alexandra (2021). Investigating corruption charges
against womenheads of government. In: International Studies Association Annual Convention, virtual, 6
April 2021 - 9 April 2021, 1-31.
Investigating Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of
Government
MADISON V. SCHRAMM U.S. Army War College 
LORIANA CRASNIC University of Zurich 
ALEXANDRA STARK New America
M
uch of the scholarship on gender and corruption suggests that women in political
office are less corrupt than men. However, in just the past five years, corruption
accusations against women heads of government, including Brazil’s Dilma
Rousseff and South Korea’s Park Geun-hye, have made headlines and led to their impeachment.
In this article, we examine whether women heads of government are more likely to be charged
with corruption and the process by which these charges are levied. Using cross-national data,
including recently-available indicators, we first demonstrate that women are significantly
more likely to be formally accused of corruption. We then explore the cases of Turkish
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to show that while
women heads of government are taxed for perceived role incongruity, the logic and efficacy
of corruption charges is also associated with the belief that women do not belong in the
political sphere and are inherently agents of subversion. These findings make a substantial




hile gender parity in executive office is radically unbalanced cross-nationally, in
recent decades, women have assumed more and more leadership roles in politics
(Schramm and Stark 2020). These leaders are often viewed as less corrupt than their
male counterparts–perceived as eschewing nefarious activities or to be biologically predisposed to be
honest, generous, and nurturing. In just the past five years, however, women heads of government, from
Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff to South Korea’s Park Geun-hye, have been formally accused of corruption.
Are women heads of government punished for their leadership roles and thus more likely to be charged


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
with corruption than their male counterparts?
The literature on the relationship between gender and corruption has largely focused on how likely
women who hold political office are to engage in corruption, and if they are penalized for this behavior
(Reyes-Housholder 2020). Studies have found that women in politics tend to either be perceived
as less corrupt than their male peers, or are, in fact, measurably less corrupt than men (Breen et al.
2017). Subsequent studies have problematized these findings, with results suggesting that the effects
of gender on corruption may be modulated by intervening variables, including social, cultural, and
institutional context (Alatas et al. 2009; Goetz 2007; Stensöta et al. 2015). However, less scholarship
has interrogated whether corruption charges are levied disproportionately against women (Swamy et al.
2001; Breen et al. 2017). On one hand, pro-women stereotypes could benefit women caught up in
corruption scandals, as people would be inclined to question (the extent of) allegations (Murray and
Norris 2010; Thomas and Adams 2010). However, a belief in women’s exceptional honesty and purity
could trigger greater support for the charges (Jones et al. 2021).
We intervene in this debate, arguing that women in leadership positions are more likely to be
accused of corruption, due to the inherently socio-political nature of high profile corruption charges.
Rather than investigate the relative tendency of women to engage in the abuse of office, we focus on
the inextricable link between gender and corruption, and how long-standing narratives make women
heads of government inherently more vulnerable to charges. Recent research from Tomashevskiy has
demonstrated that anti-bribery prosecutions are inherently political in nature, and often target entities
with whom one does not share policy preferences (Tomashevskiy 2021). Similarly, we argue that a
limited focus on corruption charges for legal misconduct overlooks critical components of variation, as
these allegations must be situated politically and socio-culturally.
In much of the academic research, corruption describes fraudulent, dishonest, or illegal conduct.
However, in political processes and popular use, corruption often signifies the changing or debasing of
an entity. During the premodern period, for example, corruption was associated with impiety, sexual
immorality, and ideas that were considered corrosive to a society (Knights et al. 2018). In recent years,
corruption has been associated with a “competition of norms” in political society, and is often identified


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
corruption implies not only specific acts of illegal misconduct, but the violation or subversion of spaces
and norms.
We argue that, while paradoxically women have been normatively associated with generosity and
honesty, women’s political leadership is vulnerable to the exploitation of longstanding narratives of
women as a subversive force. The mechanism connecting women in office with corruption charges is
embedded in the definition of corruption itself—by virtue of a woman’s presence in high office, she will
be perceived by some as inherently guilty. Politics is perceived to be a “male-dominated space” (Bos
et al. 2021), where women are trespassing. This reinforces opposition and lends credence to charges of
malfeasance by forming, “cognitive and affective glue between accusations” (Sosa 2019, 724).
We make two important contributions to the existing literature on gender and corruption. First, we
intervene in the debate on the relationship between gender and corruption to demonstrate that women
political leaders are significantly more likely to be charged with corruption. Using a cross-national
dataset of heads of government, we first demonstrate that women are significantly more likely to be
formally accused of corruption than their male counterparts. This cross-national data allows us to add
to the current literature, which primarily relies on survey experiments done in high income Western
countries. While survey experiments have the advantage of efficiently dealing with causal inference
concerns, they nonetheless do not always capture the fact that people may need to be primed for
gendered considerations. Even when priming questions are present, these are arguably not as strong as
real-life political contexts, where people more easily attach stereotypes to real candidates. Furthermore,
as recent research suggests, for various reasons (institutional, but also cultural), the findings from
high-income Western countries might not hold in other contexts. By focusing on actual political
processes, in a variety of contexts, we can more directly examine the socio-political role of gender
linking women heads of government with corruption.
Secondly, we introduce a new theory to explain this trend, focusing on the socio-political process
by which accusations of corruption are levied. We explore the cases of Turkish Prime Minister Tansu
Çiller and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to investigate the process by which these leaders were
charged with corruption. We find evidence that the logic and efficacy of corruption charges against


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
political sphere, and as agents of corruption.
In the next section, we briefly review the existing literature on gender and corruption. In section
two, we demonstrate through statistical analysis that women heads of government are significantly more
likely to be officially accused of corruption than their male counterparts. In the third section we explore
the validity of our proposed causal mechanism—how these women were perceived as not belonging
and therefore corrupting the political sphere—through case studies of corruption charges against Çiller
and Rousseff. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and avenues for future research.
EXPLORING NARRATIVES: GENDER AND CORRUPTION
The question of whether women who are elected to public office behave differently than their male
counterparts has received considerable attention from scholars in recent years. Several studies have
found that women are measurably less corrupt than men (Breen et al. 2017). Cross-national studies of
gender representation in parliaments provide evidence that more representation of women in parliament
is correlated with lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2019; Jha
and Sarangi 2018; Swamy et al. 2001). Experimental laboratory evidence also suggests that women
are less likely to engage in corrupt behavior than men (Isaac and Norton 2012; Rivas 2013).
A number of subsequent studies have problematized this finding, with results suggesting that the
effects of gender on corruption may be modulated by intervening variables, including social, cultural,
and institutional context (Alatas et al. 2009; Goetz 2007; Stensöta et al. 2015). Sung finds that the
observed correlation between gender and corruption outcomes is caused by a causally prior variable,
liberal democracy: that is, liberal democratic institutions promote both gender equality and higher-
quality governance (Sung 2003). According to Esarey and Chirillo, there is a stronger relationship
between gender and corruption in democracies, indicating that in some institutional contexts, women
experience “greater pressure to conform to existing political norms about corruption” (Esarey and
Chirillo 2013, 362). Schwindt-Bayer finds that a greater presence of women in Latin American
governments may reduce corruption, but only in combination with improvements to democratic
institutions, such as electoral accountability (Schwindt-Bayer 2016). Conversely, Branisa and Ziegler


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
still have higher levels of corruption (Branisa and Ziegler 2010). These findings are supported by
political science research indicating that democratic institutions make corrupt behavior riskier for
all leaders regardless of gender (De Mesquita et al. 2005; Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Kunicova and
Rose-Ackerman 2005; Kunicova 2006).
Nevertheless, research also shows that all else equal, people tend to view women politicians as less
corrupt than their male peers (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Treisman 2007). Studies in the development
economics literature even suggest that women’s lower propensity to engage in corrupt behavior is “a
myth” that is supported in part by women leaders’ efforts to “deflect the mistrust and criticism with
which the public regard them because of their gender with reassurances that their interest in politics is
as mothers, as guardians, as carers of the nation”(Goetz 2007, 90). Surveys suggest that women tend to
be less tolerant of corruption than men (Bowman and Gilligan 2008; Torgler and Valev 2010). Survey
evidence also suggests that voters may perceive women as marginalized within political institutions,
or more risk averse, and thus less likely to engage in corruption (Barnes and Beaulieu 2019). An
experimental survey finds that the mere presence of a female candidate systematically reduced the
probability of voters expressing suspicion of election fraud (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014). At the same
time, the institutional context in which women elected officials operate is also an important moderator
of perceptions about corruption: experimental research by Barnes et al. has found that characterizations
of women as political outsiders and as more risk-averse enhance perceptions that women in political
office will reduce corruption (Barnes et al. 2018); on the other hand, Schneider and Bos show that
stereotypes about women do not fully apply to women politicians in voters’ minds (Schneider and Bos
2014).
Given these mixed findings, it bears asking, are women politicians disproportionately charged
with corruption in comparison with their male peers? On the one hand, pro-women stereotypes, as
exemplified above, could benefit women caught up in corruption scandals, as people would be inclined
to question (the extent of) allegations (Murray and Norris 2010; Thomas and Adams 2010). Literature
shows that women are far less likely to be involved in violent crime than men, and across all types
of criminal cases, women are more likely to receive leniency in sentencing than men (Doerner and


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
On the other hand, the belief in women’s higher honesty and purity could lead to enhanced
punishment for perceived transgressions. Expectancy violation theory suggests that individuals are
punished for contravening stereotypes associated with their group (Eagly and Karau 2002; Rudman
1998). Indeed, existing political science research provides further evidence that this may be the case,
suggesting that due to stereotypes about women’s lower association with corruption, women who are
perceived to have engaged in corrupt practices may be punished for seeming to defy this stereotype. A
survey experiment in the United States, for example, found that voters’ support for women candidates
involved in an economic scandal dropped much further than for similar men candidates (Courtemanche
and Connor Green 2020). Likewise, another survey found that even with respect to sex scandals, for
which conventional wisdom would suggest that politicians rarely get punished, women are treated
harsher than men (Barnes et al. 2020). Furthermore, presidential approval models spanning 18 Latin
American countries show a negative impact of being a woman politician in the context of scandals and
executive corruption (Reyes-Housholder 2020). Survey experiments in Mexico and Brazil, however,
found that this gender-related backlash holds only in some contexts: in this case, specifically in Mexico,
but not Brazil (Pereira 2020). And a survey experiment of voters in the United Kingdom found that
women politicians do not face significantly greater punishment for corrupt behavior than their male
counterparts, but that women voters were more likely to punish women politicians for their perceived
misconduct than men (Eggers et al. 2018).
At the same time, studies also suggest that women politicians tend to be judged more harshly or
held to higher standards than their male counterparts in other areas. There is significant evidence that
women candidates are held to higher standards than their male counterparts in elections (Fulton 2012).
Bauer finds that women candidates in the United States need to be seen as more qualified than men to
win voter support (Bauer 2020). These findings suggest that women politicians could therefore also be
judged more harshly for corrupt behavior, and charged or punished accordingly.
Charging Women Leaders
The existing literature does not provide a clear indication of whether women heads of government


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
malfeasance rather than the political process by which charges are levied. We contend that perceptions
of women as an inherently subversive force substantially increase the likelihood that women heads of
government will be charged with corruption. Rather than compete with existing theories regarding
role expectancy violation, which suggests that individuals are punished for contravening stereotypes
associated with their group (Eagly and Karau 2002; Rudman 1998), our theory compliments existing
research offering an additional mechanism to explain the increased frequency at which women heads
of government are charged with corruption.
As many scholars have noted there are substantial questions of conceptual clarity in the study of
corruption. Although the term “corruption” is often used in scholarship to narrowly describe particular
illegal acts in public office (often of a financial nature), this is not how this term is primarily used in
popular and political discourse (Kroeze et al. 2018). As Sofia Wickberg shows, the term “’corruption’
comes from the Latin corruption/corrumpere – destroy or ruin,” and the Oxford English Dictionary
includes definitions such as “the destruction or spoiling of anything, especially by disintegration
or by decomposition with its attendant unwholesomeness”, as well as “the perversion of anything
from an original state of purity” (Wickberg 2019, 141). This definition of corruption is common
in popular use—for example when people describe the “corruption of the youth” or the “corruption
of innocence.” And while we do not intend to engage in an etymological debate, this origin and
connotation can be found across many latin speaking countries. As opposed to technocratic and
objective, conceptually, corruption is socio-political, both in terms of what constitutes corruption
and how it is perceived/investigated. While scholars tend to focus on the legal-rational definition of
corruption, this second definition is inextricably linked to women heads of government’s vulnerability to
corruption charges. Women are more vulnerable to this rhetoric because they are imagined as corrupting
the political space, and are subject to salient socio-cultural narratives of women as temptresses and
subversives.
The political sphere has often been defined in feminine terms, in relation to the men that are seen to
control politics (Sjoberg 2009, 44).1 As Wilcox explains, “the “imagined community” of the nation
depends upon the homosocial relations of men to protect the nation-as-women’s-body against foreign


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
incursion” (Sjoberg 2009, 37). Feminist theorists (Feder 2017; Okin 2013), for example, have long
interrogated the division between the public (the political) and the private (the familial), noting that the
public sphere and political spheres are contrasted with the feminine. As Wright explains, “. . . The
public sphere was marked originally as an exclusively male preserve and the private sphere of the home
as that to which women were relegated” (Sjoberg 2009, 193).
This distinction creates a substantial barrier to women’s entry and taxes women who occupy
political office.2 In the US, for example, Horn Sheeler and Vasby Anderson explain that “popular
frames applied to women running for the presidency since 19th century [erode women’s] credibility by
accentuating the oddity of a woman as president” (Sheeler and Anderson 2013, 242). In this context,
women in political leadership are not seen simply as out of place, but as soiling the sanctity of political
life. We can see this in Sarah’s Lewis’s popular 1839 book, Woman’s Mission, where she elucidates
this point: “Women would risk succumbing to selfishness if they were to enter the public sphere of
the state. With their nature ruined, they would thus cease to be the ‘potent agent for the amelioration
of mankind,” leading to the degeneration of civilization (Lewis 1839, 48-49).3 Williams describes a
similar phenomenon in analyzing the ascension of Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard: “Women
politicians are almost always seen as deviant due to being women in highly traditional masculine
spaces” (Williams 2017, 552). This response aligns with existing research in psychology—for example,
Dahl, Vescio, and Weaver found through an experimental study that men perceive their masculinity as
threatened when they are outperformed by women in masculine domains (such as the political sphere)
and are thus more likely to respond with anger and the sexualization of the woman (Dahl et al. 2015).
As described, the political sphere is highly masculinized and a woman holding the most senior political
position in a country could easily be perceived as outperforming their male colleagues. Similarly, in an
analysis of editorial cartoons depicting Malawi’s first female President Joyce Banda, Chikaipa found
that the commentary indicated “a president should be ideally viewed in terms of a father who will
fend for and stand for the country,” and that President Banda was often thought of as an unsuccessful
leader because of her ‘woman characteristics’ (Chikaipa 2019, 21). In analyzing the UK’s second 2014
general election leadership, Harmer, Savigny, and Ward found “Female success is presented in terms
2See also Hooper 2001, 91


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
of the capacity to emasculate male rivals; male success is presented as a consequence of displays of
strength, aggression, and masculinity” (Harmer et al. 2017, 937). Women in office are perceived as
inherently guilty of subverting the integrity of the office, and charges of corruption connote this. As
Sosa explains, “. . . corruption is not only a judgement about ethics, but a judgement about belonging”
(Sosa 2019, 735).
This sense that women do not belong in the political realm, and are by their very presence debasing
the office, is reinforced by longstanding cross socio-cultural narratives of women as corrupting forces.
From Eve and Jezebel to Lady Macbeth, Cersei Lanister, and Marquise de Merteuil, the trope of
the powerful, subversive fatale woman (femme fatal) seducing and corrupting men pervades movies,
literature, and religious discourses. This lens has been applied to coverage comparing Hillary Clinton
and Argentina’s Fernández de Kirchner to Lady Macbeth. And in China, Fang illustrates through
digital ethnography, discourse analysis, and interviews, “. . . That a cultural script derived from the
Chinese storytelling tradition of “women are a source of trouble” serves as a contemporary narrative
of corruption”(Chen 2017, 67). We can see this in the literature on the Friekorps in Germany, as
Hooper describes, “In their novels and memoirs, the male body was depicted as dry, clean, hard, erect,
and intact, but always threatened by contamination from feminine dirt, slime and mire. Women’s
bodies were seen as messy, open, wild, and promiscuous—as engulfing swamps in which men could
be annihilated. Women, communists, and the rebellious working class represented a ‘flood’ or ‘tide’
threatening to break down both masculine integrity and established social barriers” (Hooper 2001, 83).
How can we reconcile the trope of the subversive femme fatale with normative expectations that
women will be more honest, and less corrupt? These are the not competing narratives, but rather two
sides of the same coin. Like many other binary or trichotomous narratives regarding women (Sjoberg
and Gentry 2007), women are perceived as either self-sacrificing and beyond reproach, or subversive
and sexually deviant (Hametner et al. 2021). While research on women and corruption has largely
focused on the positive stereotype, in this paper we examine the effects of the negative narrative to
explain the trend above.
These narratives are deeply embedded in socio-cultural discourse and can easily be activated or


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
women heads of government, they are given credence by these pre-existing narratives and imagined as
intrinsically true. The narratives themselves, and the ways in which they appear and are understood, can
of course be distinct across cultures, as gender is ultimately an intersubjective social construct. While
striving to not essentialize all women across the globe as behaving in particular ways, we nevertheless
endeavor to demonstrate how pervasive and similar some of these narratives are across cultures.
In the next sections, we use cross-national data on heads of government, as well as two case studies,
to demonstrate that women heads of government are more likely to be charged with corruption than
their male counterparts. We therefore test two hypotheses associated with the above theory:
• H1: Women heads of government are more likely to be formally charged with corruption.
• H2: Perceptions of women as subversive forces, that do not belong in the political sphere,
increase the likelihood they will be charged with corruption.
EMPIRICS
Statistical Analyses
We conduct an initial analysis using the Archigos data set on leaders (Goemans et al. 2009). The data
set includes information on individual heads of state, such as the manner in which rulers enter and leave
political power, the post-tenure fate of the ruler, and other personal information. As Archigos only codes
imprisonment of leaders, we created a new variable coding cases where charges for corruption have
been brought against the leader (regardless of whether the leader was subsequently imprisoned), either
during the leader’s tenure, or up to five years afterward their tenure ends (as the process of bringing
charges often extends to after a leader’s tenure ends). To do so, we searched the Archigos codebook
using the ‘corrupt*’ search term.4 Leaders who were accused of corruption by foreign governments,
by the public, or by political rivals were not coded as charged. We were solely interested in allegations
brought by domestic judicial or legislative institutions, in order to capture formal charges of corruption.
Out of 2119 leader observations, we have 14 cases of women leaders accused of corruption (out of
4For those leaders whose terms had not yet ended by 31 December 2015, we conducted independent research to


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
a total of 68 women leader observations), and 37 cases of men leaders accused of the same crime
(out of a total of 2051 men leader observations). Given that we base our coding of corruption on an
existing dataset with limited information about each leader, it is possible that we are undercounting
cases of corruption charges. Measurement bias is, however, likely not systematic; in other words, there
should not be any specific gender-related bias in how cases of corruption are counted. Even if there is
an underlying bias in the corruption coding, it would have to be quite large to explain the following
findings.
Descriptive statistics show a clear difference between the rate of women leaders and the rate of
men leaders who were charged with corruption. Eighteen percent of women leaders were accused of
corruption compared to only 2 percent of men leaders (see Figure 1). There is also a small difference
between the rate at which women leaders were imprisoned compared to men, conditional on corruption
charges, (see Figure 2). To further probe these differences, we use our new measure of charges of
corruption as our dependent variable, and gender of leaders as our main independent variable, in a
logit model spanning the 1945-2015 period with various control variables, standard errors clustered at
the country level, and specifications for country and year fixed effects.
As mentioned, our main models contain a battery of standard control variables, including Polity’s
index of regime type (Marshall and Jaggers Marshall and Jaggers), GDP growth (Bolt Bolt), and from
the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2015), judicial constraints on the executive, executive corruption
and media bias. All of these could impact readiness to accuse and imprison corrupt leaders overall.
We control for regime type using a country’s Polity score when the leader left office, as this could
impact the readiness to accuse leaders of corruption, as well as the degree and manner in which
leaders are subsequently prosecuted. According to a large literature, GDP growth can serve as a rough
proxy for a leader’s approval ratings, which could also impact corruption charges (Fauvelle-Aymar
and Stegmaier 2013). We also control for judicial constraints on the executive through the V-Dem
index on the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings and
executive corruption by means of the V-Dem index on executive bribery and corrupt exchanges. More
corrupt and less judicially independent countries could exhibit more cases of alleged corruption and
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FIGURE 1. Corruption allegations


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
public corruption we could nevertheless see a reverse effect, as leaders here would have the means to
stop such allegations from becoming official. Media bias, measured as media bias against opposition
parties or candidates, also from the V-Dem project, could also positively impact corruption allegations
and imprisonment as it is often times through independent journalism that such cases come to light in
the first place.
Beyond these overall systemic level variables influencing corruption, we add controls that proxy the
networks and resources leaders have at hand to influence potential corruption charges and sentencing.
We include a control for women’s political participation in the country, understood to include women’s
descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power,
from V-Dem. From the Archigos data set, we include several individual level leader variables, such as
months in office, family ties to other leaders, and entry into power (whether regular, irregular or by
foreign imposition). More descriptive statistics on all our variables can be found in the Appendix.
In Table 1, results show that, controlling for these country and leader specific characteristics, women
leaders are much more likely than men leaders to be accused of corruption. Holding covariates at their
means in Model 1, we find that the relative probability of being accused of corruption for women is
110 percentage points higher than for men. Model 2 and 3 show that the statistical significance of this
effect holds when using country and year fixed effects. In the appendix we also show a variety of
other model specifications, in which we variously include alternative control variables such as leaders’
political orientation or their approval ratings (Table A2), test alternative measures for institutional
context (Tables A3 and A4), probe for the effect of including interaction terms with level of women’s
empowerment (Table A5), and use multinomial simultaneous equation models to ascertain the effect of
gender on leader post-tenure fate, controlling for corruption allegations (Table A6). In all models, the
size and statistical significance of the effect remain similar.
It is worth noting here that there may be a selection effect with respect to our findings: women who
attain the highest office could be systematically more or less corrupt in practice than men. However,
because corruption is necessarily covert behavior that is not always discovered, it is very difficult (if
not impossible) to measure and compare the empirical “level” of corruption that leaders engage in.
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TABLE 1. Corruption allegation models
Dependent variable: Corruption allegation
(1) (2) (3)
Woman 2.458∗∗∗ 3.225∗∗∗ 4.083∗∗
(0.384) (0.790) (1.382)
Polity -0.037 -0.111 -0.227
(0.043) (0.069) (0.121)
GDP growth -0.531 -1.701 -1.776
(0.758) (1.420) (1.554)
Judicial constraints on executive 0.259 -0.788 -2.234
(0.533) (0.859) (1.436)
Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges -0.609∗∗∗ -0.242 0.172
(0.130) (0.324) (0.581)
Media bias 0.380 0.717∗ 0.368
(0.219) (0.360) (0.433)
Women’s political participation 1.353 3.012∗∗ 1.475
(0.755) (0.963) (2.377)
Months in office 0.003∗ 0.007∗ 0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Ties to other leaders 0.600 0.342 0.421
(0.328) (0.784) (0.892)
Entry into power 1.698∗ 2.372 4.495
(0.765) (1.352) (3.093)
Country fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X
Constant -7.355∗∗∗ -9.044∗∗∗ -7.969
(0.967) (1.884) (4.729)
Observations 1864 636 294
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.270 0.322
Chi2 96.31 . .
p 2.98e-16 . .
Standard errors in parentheses
∗


















































































Corruption Charges Against Women Heads of Government
Nevertheless, adjudicating whether women heads of government are actually more corrupt and are
therefore appropriately more likely to be punished for it, or are more likely to be accused and punished
for corruption because of their gender, is necessary if we are to believe the results above. To do so, and
further explore the causal mechanism explaining our findings, we turn to the case study of Turkish
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller.
While our statistical analysis demonstrates that women heads of government are significantly more
likely to face investigation for corruption than men, we now turn to an investigation of the causal
mechanisms that produce this trend.
Case Studies
In the following two case studies, we explore the causal mechanism identified in our second hypothesis.
By pairing our statistical analysis with qualitative case studies, we are using nested analysis, a mixed-
methods research strategy. As Lieberman notes, nested analysis is a useful strategy to “assess the
plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables... This integrated strategy improves
the prospects of making valid causal inferences in cross-national and other forms of comparative
research by drawing on the distinct strengths of two important approaches” (Lieberman 2005; ?). The
below case studies constitute what George and Bennett call a “heuristic case study,” one that inductively
identifies new causal mechanisms (George et al. 2005, 75). Drawing on primary and secondary sources,
the cases use process tracing in order to “identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and
causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent
variable” (George et al. 2005, 206).
The cases vary in both time (1993 to 1996, and 2011 to 2016) and space, and variation in institutional
context. While Brazil is a presidential democracy with lower levels of executive constraints (6 Polity
Score), Turkey is a parliamentary democracy characterized by more executive constraints (7 Polity
Score).5. Most importantly, the cases show variation in women’s representation in political office and
women’s political participation writ large. When Ciller was in office, women accounted for only 2.4
percent of the MPs in the legislature. Alternatively, at the beginning of Rouseff’s second term, women
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accounted for 9 percent of the lower house compared to 13.6 in the upper house (Union 2020). More
generally, levels of women’s political empowerment were substantially higher (.83) in Brazil in 2015,
than in Turkey in 1993 (.54) (Coppedge et al. 2015).
In examining evidence of the mechanisms we propose, we find substantial evidence that perceptions
of women as subversive forces, that do not belong in the political sphere, increased the likelihood of
their vulnerability to the charges.
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller
Tansu Çiller, Turkey’s first (and so far, only) female prime minister, served as Turkey’s prime minister
from 1993 to 1996, and as both Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs between
1996 and 1997, facing several allegations of corruption during and after her time in office. In 1996,
the Turkish parliament opted to set up a special commission to probe corruption charges against her
claiming that she had improperly tampered with the privatization of two companies, but in February
1997, parliament voted against sending the investigation to the Supreme Court (noa b; Couturier
Couturier). In June 2000, she was again cleared by Parliament, this time for charges that she had
siphoned money from a covert intelligence fund that she used to finance her party (noa a).
Çiller may indeed have engaged in corrupt acts during her time in office, as many of her male
peers did. However, the ubiquitously high level of corruption in Turkish politics across parties and
individuals in this period does not explain variation in whether leaders are not just accused of, but
also formally investigated for, corruption. This case demonstrates that corruption charges were at least
in part the result of perceptions of Ciller’s gender, and that she was seen as guilty of corruption by
virtue of holding the office, augmented by charges that she had abandoned the promises she made
to Turkish women to serve as a bulwark against Islamist political forces when she agreed to join a
coalition government with the Refah Party, a decision seen as both selfish and cynical.
Çiller’s gender crystallized the idea that she had betrayed her party and voters and engaged in
cynical political manipulations to stay in office, thereby corrupting the office of prime minister as well
as the office of leader of the True Path Party. At first, her personal image as a professional, highly
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modernizing, secular, and western-oriented. Yet when Ciller agreed to form a coalition with the
Islamist Refah Party, political elites and the media began to paint her as avaricious, grasping, and
greedy for power. Notably, men who engaged in similar political maneuvers were seen positively as
deft politicians rather than as degrading their office by engaging in this kind of political maneuvering.
The sudden shift in Ciller’s gendered image, from fresh-faced, secular modernizer to avaricious and
grasping, and her failure to live up to the ‘pure’ image of a woman in political office, became key
reasons that political elites lost confidence in her. This loss of confidence led directly to multiple
parliamentary votes on whether to send corruption charges against Ciller to Turkey’s Supreme Court.
Çiller’s image as a professional, highly-educated, young woman who had studied and earned a
graduate degree in the United States was closely linked to her political views as a secularist and a
modernizer (Bennett 2010; Kesgin 2012; Inal 2017). In keeping with this image, Çiller campaigned
vigorously against the Islamist opposition party Refah in the 1995 elections, contrasting their positions
with her secular politics. Çiller targeted women as a constituency in her 1995 campaign, using
secularism as a tool to do so. She pledged to defend Turkey’s secularism and called Refah “murderous
merchants of religion” (Skard 2015, 395). Her campaign argued that only Çiller was courageous
enough to oppose Erbakan, the leader of Refah, and that a vote for her center-right opponent was
actually a vote for Islamists. Another newspaper ad declared, “mothers, sisters, brides, girls, fiancees...
I warn all of you. The Welfare Party cadres of Yilmaz are against the rights Turkish women have gained.
Don’t forget that the votes you give to Yilmaz will help the Welfare Party cadres” (Bardach 1997, 16).
The True Path Party won the second largest share of seats in Parliament in the December 1995
elections. In March 1996, Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz, head of the center-right Motherland Party, formed
a coalition government with Yilmaz as prime minister, but this government proved short-lived. As
opposition leader, Erbakan announced his intention to call for a parliamentary investigation into Çiller’s
role in the privatization of Tofas and Tedas. Although he was her coalition partner, Yilmaz – who
had also called for an investigation into Çiller’s role in the Tofas and Tedas privatizations during the
campaign, voted in favor of the investigations (Meyer 1997).
In a move that was shocking to many, Çiller then formed a coalition with Refah in June 1996.
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Affairs. Çiller’s agreement appeared to be a means of avoiding corruption charges in Parliament, as
Erbakan apparently agreed to drop the charges in exchange for her support. Reportedly, other politicians
in Turkey “accuse[d] her of forging the alliance to shield herself from a series of inquiries into her
personal finances” (Kinzer Kinzer). The coalition government quickly drew opposition from secularist
forces in Turkey, including the powerful military. In June 1997, the military forced the government out
of power in a soft coup (Cinar et al. 2002; Bennett 2010).
Çiller’s decision to form a coalition government with Refah fatally undermined her credibility
across politics and Turkish society. The New York Times noted that “some Turks view Ms. Çiller, who
has denied all wrong doing, as cynical and mendacious” (Kinzer Kinzer). Çiller was described in a
1997 New Republic article in harsher terms, as “the singularly ambitious, pathologically duplicitous
former prime minister whose craven deal-making with the fundamentalists precipitated the whole crises
in the first place” (Bardach 1997, 16-17). A prominent Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, said of
Çiller that “she will make a deal with anyone, anyone who will keep her in power” (Bardach 1997, 18).
Her decision, in other words, was seen as a betrayal of her gender and a corruption of the office itself.
Çiller’s decision undermined her gendered image as a secular modernist, and her willingness to do
so created an equally gendered backlash where she was painted as mendacious and greedy for power
for doing so, leading many former supporters to desert her. By June 1997, 35 members of her party
in parliament had left the party (noa e). Çiller even lost the support of her former mentor President
Demirel. Reports claimed that “many former allies of Mrs. Çiller say they are furious at her ” (noa c).
Analysts ascribed her downfall to a “hunger for power at any cost, resulting in too many compromises,”
and a willingness to shift “policies and discourse as the situation warranted” (Bennett 2010, 132).
Allegations of corruption quickly became a wedge that political elites, including the opposition as
well as former supporters, used to push Çiller out of power after her political star fell. Media reports
increasingly focused on Çiller’s “‘wealth, family, character, leadership style,’ and political dealings”
(Bennett 2010, 130-131). A Turkish Daily News editorial claimed “there have been widespread
allegations that Çiller and people associated with her have been using their offices to gain undue
advantage" (noa d).
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many believed at the time that they could lead not just to her fall from grace, but to imprisonment
or exile (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). But her behavior was not publicly noticeably different from the
male politicians who surrounded her. As Arat notes, “she acted like the male leaders before her in a
number of ways. Neither her priorities nor accusations of corruption surrounding her were novel to
Turkish politics” (Arat 1998, 18). An expert on Turkish politics commented at the time that “Turkey
has proved reluctant to deal with corruption. It’s significant that the National Assembly is handling
alleged corruption in such a way” (YACKLEY YACKLEY). And although Çiller had been accused
of corruption during her time in office, she had faced little pushback within her party around earlier
corruption allegations. Rather, her “unforgivable sin was the coalition agreement with Refah” (Meyer
1997).
Of course, it is impossible to test the counter-factual, and it is likely that a male politician in Çiller’s
position would have also lost some support for the same political move. Yet in Çiller’s case, many
analysts of Turkish politics have noted that gender played an important role in how she was perceived
after she came into office, in stark contrast with many of her male peers. While Çiller’s political mentor
Demirel was depicted as a deft political actor with a “moderating and conciliatory style,” Çiller was
described as having a “lust for command” (Bennett 2010, 131). According to Inal,
Her use of her gender, which helped her in the beginning of her career, ultimately turned
against her... Her unethical leadership especially her lack of integrity became the catalyst
establishing her sameness with the previous leadership experiences of the Turkish political
scene but also gave the people a sense of being cheated because it came from a woman
(Inal 2017, 19).
Next, we turn to a second case study of President Dilma Rouseff of Brazil.
President Dilma Rousseff
We next examine how perceptions of gender affected the process by which Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff was charged with corruption. We find that perceptions of Rousseff’s gender augmented
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Building from the work of Sosa (Sosa 2019) and Encarnación (Encarnación 2017), we investigate how
corruption was used as a catchall by Rouseff’s opposition, and how she was seen as guilty by virtue of
holding the office of the presidency.
Dilma Rousseff was elected to her first term in 2010, following a successful career in the federal
government. She grew up in a middle-class family in Belo Horizonte, lacking dynastic or other political
ties in her youth. In her twenties, Rousseff joined the National Liberation Command, a Marxist guerilla
organization committed to overthrowing the military dictatorship. At 22, she was arrested for stealing a
safe belonging to the governor of São Paulo and brutally tortured in prison. Her imprisonment and role
in the National Liberation Command would be brought up time and again during her presidency as
evidence of her subversion.
Rousseff was released from prison in 1972, and in 1977 earned a degree in economics from the Rio
Grande do Sul Federal University. She went on to serve at City of Porto Alegre’s secretary of treasury,
and later Rio Grande do Sul secretary of energy before joining the Lula da Silva administration in
2003. Brazil’s government is dominated by men at all levels, and has the lowest levels of women
in the legislature in Latin America (Union 2020). Despite this, Rousseff earned a reputation as an
effective, no-nonsense bureaucrat. In 2005, she became President Lula da Silva’s chief of staff and was
handpicked to be his successor at the end of his second term.6
Socio-politically, the office of the presidency in Brazil is deeply gendered. As Sosa explains,
“Brazilian populist leaders such as Getulio Vargas in the 1930s and Lula da Silva in the 2000s often
positioned their charismatic leadership in terms of father figures, not only in order to establish a
relationship with the people, but also to position their political family” (Sosa 2019, 18).7 Despite her
sterling record, many viewed Rousseff as “‘Lula’s puppet’ (Encarnación 2017, 85) or ‘Lula in a skirt’
(Sosa 2019, 718), or ’the woman Lula gave to Brazil’(Franceschet et al. 2016, 12). Both opponents
and supporters cast Rousseff as a placeholder, expecting largely a continuation of Lula da Silva’s
policies. Before her election campaign, Rousseff worked with consultants on her public image, but
her candidacy challenged antiquated conceptions of women’s roles. Rousseff was a former Marxist
6Both Rousseff and Lula da Silva are a part of the Worker’s Party (PT).
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guerrilla, divorced, and as Omar Encarnación describes,
Brazilians thought her age (68 at the time of her impeachment) , short hair, and professional
attire were an affront to conventional standards of femininity, which emphasize youth,
flowing locals, and voluptuous features. For the media, Rousseff’s status as an unmarried
divorce supported the view that she was aggressive and lacked sex appeal. Like many
other female politicians, Rousseff has also been criticized for being too serious, being too
much of a wonk, and lacking charisma (Encarnación 2017, 89).
Later, in her second term as president, Rousseff’s image would be juxtaposed with vice president
Temer’s wife who was described as “‘beautiful, maiden-like, and a housewife’” (Argolo Argolo).
In 2010, Rousseff was elected to the presidency with 56 percent of the vote. She maintained strong
public support throughout most of her first term, however, by 2013, the aftershocks of the 2009 Global
Financial Crisis produced a recession in Brazil and Rousseff’s popularity ebbed from over 60 percent
of respondents believing she was doing a “good/excellent job” in May 2013 to less than 30 percent
responding so by July (Jalalzai 2015, 208). During her campaign for re-election in 2014, Rousseff
received a disproportionate amount of negative coverage compared to male candidates and the Brazilian
Democratic Party indicated that they would not accept the election results (Feres Junior and Sassara
2018).
Ultimately, Rousseff was re-elected to her second term in 2014 by the narrowest margin since the
country democratized in 1986. While most newly elected leaders experience a bit of a honeymoon
period, the disproportionately negative coverage of Rousseff continued after the election, only increasing
until her ousting (Feres Junior and Sassara 2018). Following a speech on International Women’s Day
on March 8, 2015, popular protests against the leader took hold. In addition to the poor economic
climate, public anger was compounded by the construction of expensive sports facilities for the 2014
world cup and 2016 Olympics.
Shortly following the devastating Zika outbreak in April, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)
announced their decision to delay approval of the 2014 budget. The TCU requested Rousseff explain
allegedly masking the size of the budget deficit. Rousseff was charged with delaying payments to the


























































































































Schramm, Crasnic, and Stark
used by her predecessors (Sosa 2019, 717). That October, the TCU rejected the government accounts.
The opposition sent another impeachment request (which has previously been unsuccessful), which was
accepted by lower house speaker Eduardo Cunha in December 2015. Some claimed Cunha was angry
at the president for not protecting him against an investigation in the House Ethics Committee—later
that August he would be charged with taking a five-million-dollar bribe related to Petrobras (Marcello
Marcello). Members of the President’s coalition, soon turned against the president, while aides of
Rousseff suggested “. . . The impeachment charges were retribution for her refusing to preemptively
pardon key members of Congress from charges linked to the investigation” (Sosa 2019, 736).8 In
fact, on a leaked recording, Senator Juca described the logic of the impeachment as “to ‘staunch the
bleeding’—i.e. shut down the corruption probe and save everyone else from jail”” (Encarnación 2017,
87).9 Rousseff was scapegoated despite the fact that many of her male peers were undeniably guilty
of much more serious crimes. Why then, was Rousseff charged with corruption, and why was the
campaign to oust her so effective?
The sexism that animated the charges was both instrumental and sincere, deployed by actors who
saw Rousseff as unfit because of her gender and understood the mobilizing power of this rhetoric.
Leaders within Rousseff’s coalition, including Vice President Temer, were never comfortable with a
woman as president, and the opposition routinely implied—if not explicitly claimed—Rousseff was a
“lesbian,” “communist,”, “whore,” and “subversive” (Encarnación 2017; Sosa 2019). Rousseff was
frequently portrayed as corrupting the office of the presidency. During the impeachment process, for
example, Senador Magno Malta described Rousseff’s presidency as gangrene claiming, "If we amputate
the leg, we save the body" (Miroff Miroff).
During the Chamber of Deputies vote, legislators held placards reading ‘Tchau Querida’, or
‘goodbye darling’” (Encarnación 2017, 88). Members of the Chamber justified the vote claiming they
8This also coincided with Operation Carwash, a large-scale investigation beginning in 2014 into money laundering
and corruption related to Petrobras, the state oil company. Although over 400 have since been indicted, Rousseff
was quickly cleared of any wrongdoing doing despite her role as chair of the board of Petrobras from 2003 to
2010.
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were voting to “‘save the county,’ ‘end communism’, and ‘restore the foundations of Chirstianity’”
(Encarnación 2017, 88). As previously discussed, in this way misogyny served as the connective
tissue between the charges, reinforcing their plausibility. Public opposition to Rousseff was similarly
gendered and included sexualized fantasies of punishment. One of the more insidious examples was
a “sticker(s) showing Rousseff with her legs spread apart around their gas tank openings, sexually
violating her image every time they filled up” (Krook and Sanín 2020, 749).
When representatives voted in April, they claimed to impeach Rousseff “in the name of their families
and God” (Feres Junior and Sassara 2018, 228). By the end of August ,the process was approved and
Rousseff was removed from office. This despite the fact that impeachable offenses in Brazil must both
violate the law and produce national instability, criteria that the allegations against Rousseff did not
meet. In their analysis, Dos Santos and Jalalzai found that "...Misogyny was an important element
during the crisis that culminated in Rousseff’s impeachment" (Dos Santos and Jalalazai 2021). When
Temer ascended to the presidency, he created an exclusively white and male cabinet (Sosa 2019).
CONCLUSION
In this article, we intervene in the debate regarding the relationship between gender and corruption,
by focusing on the process by which women are charged and why these charges tend to stick. We
demonstrated that women heads of government are significantly more likely to be charged with
corruption than their male counterparts, holding other factors equal. Through case studies of Turkish
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, we argue that perceptions of
women in the public sphere as inherently subversive increases the likelihood corruption charges will be
levied against women heads of government.
The case study of Ciller suggests that women heads of government are likely to experience a stronger
backlash for behavior that undermines their fellow political elites, especially when that behavior pushes
against or undermines that leader’s stereotypical feminine behavior. Since women politicians are
typically perceived as less corrupt than men, they are likely to incur a more forceful backlash, from both
opponents and supporters, for perceived corrupt behavior. Additionally, corruption investigations and
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office when they believe she has acted against their political interests. We identified similar patterns
in Brazil—the president was likely punished for role incongruity and the charges themselves were
initiated by actors who saw the president as acting against their interests. We also find evidence that the
logic of the charges against Rousseff were buttressed by narratives of her as a subversive (Encarnación
2017; Sosa 2019). In both cases, the corruption charges were strengthened both by perceptions of role
incongruity, and narratives of women’s presence in political office as inherently subversive. Future
research can further interrogate this finding by developing cases to test this causal mechanism and
build theory.
There are significant implications for this research regarding state stability, and the prospects
for future women heads of government. First, following evidence presented by Reyes-Housholder
(Reyes-Housholder 2020) and Carlin, Carreras, and Love (Carlin et al. 2020) that women leaders’
approval ratings are more negatively impacted by corruption charges than their male counterparts, our
findings imply that not only are women more likely to be charged, but they are also more likely to face
more substantial backlash. This could easily undermine the stability of women’s tenure, and executive
offices more generally. Secondly, women heads of government are important sources of symbolic
power for women in politics. If their tenures are disproportionately associated with corruption, this
will inevitably impact the prospects for women running for executive office in the future.
Ultimately, we hope these findings contribute to a small but growing literature on how women
heads of government fare in the highest office. This research is critical to our understanding of politics
in a world where more women are breaking the highest glass ceiling by becoming heads of government.
As research in this area advances – and more women serving in the highest office yields more cases –
future research, such as content analysis of media coverage of these women leaders, can further test
and refine these explanations.
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